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Abstract
In this paper a new decision rule for capital budgeting is consid-
ered. A ¯rm has the opportunity to invest in a project of uncertain
pro¯tability. Over time, the ¯rm receives additional information in the
form of signals indicating the pro¯tability of the project. The belief
that the ¯rm needs to have in a pro¯table project for investment to be
optimal is calculated and analyzed. It is shown that the probability
of investing in a project with low pro¯tability is larger when the ¯rm
uses a conventional rule like the net present value rule. As a coun-
terintuitive result it is obtained that it can be optimal to undertake
the investment at a later point in time in case the expected number
of signals per time unit is higher. Also an error measure is discussed
that indicates the accuracy of capital budgeting rules in this stochastic
environment.
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11 Introduction
In this paper a ¯rm is considered that faces the decision whether or not
to invest in a project. The project's pro¯tability is not known beforehand.
However, imperfect signals arrive over time indicating the project either to
be good or bad. These signals cause the ¯rm to update its valuation of
the project. The aim is to determine the timing of investment as well as
the e®ects of the quantity and the quality of the signals on the investment
decision.
The problem can for example be the adoption of a technological innova-
tion whose e®ectiveness in unknown. One can also think of a ¯rm having
the opportunity to enter a new market which involves sunk investment costs.
The uncertainty can then for instance be caused by unknown consumer in-
terest, e.g. demand can be favourable or not. Consider for instance the
telecommunication sector where there is one company that can supply a
new service to its customers. However, the company is uncertain about the
possible success of the new service. Occasionally, the ¯rm receives signals
from its environment from which it can deduce information concerning the
pro¯tability of the new service. Here we can think of market performance
of related products and also of more general economic indicators that may
in°uence the market performance of the new service. Another example is
given by a pharmaceutical ¯rm that is developing a new drug. Test results
are coming in indicating whether the drug is e®ective or not.
This situation is modelled by considering a project that can be either
good or bad. If the project is bad, the optimal strategy is to refrain from
investment. Since the ¯rm incurs sunk costs when investing in the project,
a loss is su®ered in case the project is bad and the ¯rm invests. At irregular
intervals, however, the ¯rm receives a signal about the quality of the project.
The signals indicate whether the project is good or bad, but it is known to
the ¯rm that the signal is imperfect. The points in time at which signals
arrive are unknown beforehand. Every time the ¯rm receives a signal it
updates its belief that the project is good in a Bayesian way. Therefore,
by delaying investment and waiting for more signals to arrive, the ¯rm can
predict with higher accuracy whether the market is good or bad. This
induces an option value of waiting. The question is how many good signals
2relative to bad signals the ¯rm needs to observe, to justify investment in the
project. We show that this is equivalent to ¯nding a critical level for the
belief that the project is good, given the available signals. This belief turns
out to depend critically on the quality of the signal, i.e. the probability with
which the signals re°ect the true state of the world, as well as the frequency
at which signals occur over time.
The signals are modelled as two correlated binomially distributed ran-
dom variables. The ¯rst one models the arrival of signals while the latter
models its type, i.e. indicating that the project is good or bad. As soon as
the ¯rm has invested, the true state of the world is revealed.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First of all, our
model has strong similarities with the standard real options model as devel-
oped by McDonald and Siegel (1986) and for which Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
develop the basic framework. It is important to note that the way we deal
with uncertainty in our model di®ers crucially from this literature. Within
our framework more information becomes available over time, whereas in
the standard real-options literature uncertainty is constant over time caused
by, for instance, price uncertainty in an existing market. In other words,
whereas our model is a decision problem with incomplete information where
nature determines the state of the world only at the beginning with infor-
mation arriving to resolve uncertainty, the framework typically used in the
literature is a decision problem with complete information, where nature
determines the state of the world at each consecutive point in time. More
formally, the stochastic processes in these models have stationary increments
that are independent of the past. Examples of processes that are often used
are Brownian motion, Poisson process, and L¶ evy processes. In contrast, the
increments of the stochastic process that we consider are not stationary and
path-dependent. Typically, the variance of the stochastic process decreases
over time. This implies that the standard tools (cf. Oksendal (2000)) cannot
be used in our framework.
A second branch of literature to which our paper is related is the R&D
literature. In her seminal paper, Reinganum (1981) develops a model of
dynamic R&D competition. In this model technological innovations arrive
via a Poisson process and the in°uence of patents is analysed. Again, the
stochastic process driving the innovation process has stationary increments
3that are independent of the past. The paper by Malueg and Tsutsui (1997)
introduces learning into the Reinganum framework and is therefore more
closely related to this paper. In the endogenous growth literature, Aghion
and Howitt (1992) use a similar framework as Reinganum to model Schum-
peterian growth.
The papers mentioned above all consider a stream of technological in-
novations where there is uncertainty about when these innovations become
available. Moscarini and Smith (2001) consider a situation where a single
decision maker faces a project whose future stream of cash °ow is uncer-
tain. The decision maker however receives a signal indicating the quality of
the project. This signal is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion
with (unknown) drift. The task of the decision maker is to infer the drift
term. He can reduce the variance of the signal by investing more in R&D
at a higher cost. So the decision maker faces an optimal stopping prob-
lem, i.e. when to invest (if at all), as well as an optimal control problem,
i.e. how much to invest in R&D. Again, the main di®erence with our ap-
proach is the way uncertainty is modelled. Since, in contrast to Moscarini
and Smith (2001), in our paper the stochastic increments are non-stationary
and path-dependent. For the sake of analytical tractability, we will assume
that signals are costless.
The way we model uncertainty is most related to Jensen (1982). The
main di®erence is that in Jensen's model, signals only give information on
the probability of the project being good. The probability of a good project
is considered to be an unknown parameter. In each period one receives a
signal about the true value of the unknown parameter. This signal is used
to update the beliefs, just as in our model, i.e. the belief is a conditional
probability based on past information. In short, one forms a belief on the
belief in a good project. However, in Jensen's model, a good signal not
only increases the belief in a good project, but it also increases the ¯rm's
probabilistic belief in receiving a good signal in the next period. In other
words, the ¯rm not only updates its belief but also the odds of the coin
nature °ips to determine the project's pro¯tability. In our model it holds
that the quality of the signal is independent of past realizations, i.e. the
investor exactly knows the odds of the coin that nature °ips. Due to this
simpli¯cation the analysis of our framework provides an explicit expression
4for the critical value of the belief in a good project at which investing is op-
timal, contrary to Jensen (1982) who could only show existence. This is the
main contribution of the paper. Furthermore, it allows us to simulate the
investment problem and the e®ects of the model parameters on the invest-
ment timing. We show that given constant prior odds of a good project, the
probability of investment within a certain time interval need not increase in
quantity and quality of signals. Another counterintuitive result we obtain
is that, given that the project is good, the expected time before investment
need not be monotonous in the parameter governing the Poisson arrivals of
signals. In other words, it is possible that investment is expected to take
place later when the expected number of signals per time unit is higher.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the formal model is
described. After that, the optimal investment decision will be derived in
Section 3. In Section 4 an error measure for analysing the performance
of capital budgeting rules in this model of investment under uncertainty is
introduced. In Section 5 the decision rule from Section 3 will be interpreted
using some numerical examples. In the ¯nal section some conclusions are
drawn and directions for future research are discussed.
2 The Model
Consider a ¯rm that faces the choice of investing in a certain project. The
project can be either good, leading to high revenues, UH, or bad, leading
to low revenues UL.1 Without loss of generality we assume that UL = 0.
The sunk costs involved in investing in the project are given by I > 0.
Furthermore, it is assumed that there is a constant discount rate, r.
It is assumed that when the ¯rm receives the option to invest, it has a
prior belief about the investment project being good or bad. The ex ante
probability of high revenues is given by
I P(H) = p0:
Occasionally, the ¯rm receives a signal indicating the project to be good
(denoted by h) or a signal indicating the project to be bad (denoted by l).
The probabilities with which these signals occur depend on the true state of
1The revenues represent an in¯nite cash °ow discounted at rate r.
5project/signal h l
H ¸ 1 ¡ ¸
L 1 ¡ ¸ ¸
Table 1: Probability of a signal indicating a good or bad market, given the
true state of the project. The ¯rst row (column) lists the probabilities in
case of a good project (good signal) and the second row (column) in case
of a bad project (bad signal). A good (bad) project is denoted by H (L),
while a good (bad) signal is denoted by h (l).
the project. A correct signal occurs with probability ¸ > 1
2, see Table 1. As
soon as the ¯rm invests in the project, the state of the market is revealed.
In reality this may take some time, but we abstract from that. The signals'
arrivals are modelled via a Poisson process with parameter ¹ > 0. The
Poisson assumption is made to make the model analytically tractable when
using dynamic programming techniques. Hence, denoting the number of





1 with probability ¹dt,
0 with probability 1 ¡ ¹dt,
with
n(0) = 0:







1 with probability ¸ if H and 1 ¡ ¸ if L,
0 with probability 1 ¡ ¸ if H and ¸ if L,
and
g(0) = 0:
6For notational convenience the time indices will be suppressed in the remain-
der of the paper. The belief that revenues are high, i.e. that the project is
good, given the number of signals n and the number of h-signals g · n is
denoted by p(n;g). Now, the conditional expected payo® of the ¯rm can be
written as,
I E(Ujn;g) = p(n;g)(UH ¡ I) ¡ (1 ¡ p(n;g))I:
The structure of the model is such that with respect to the signals there
are two main aspects. The ¯rst one is the parameter which governs the
arrival of the signals, ¹. This parameter is a measure for the quantity of
the signals, since 1=¹ denotes the average time between two signals. The
other component is the probability of the correctness of the signal, ¸. This
parameter is a measure for the quality of the signals. For the model to
make sense, it is assumed that ¸ > 1
2.2 In this paper learning { or belief
updating { takes place by using the Bayesian approach. This, together with
the condition ¸ > 1
2, implies that the belief in high revenues converges to one
or to zero if the market is good or bad, respectively, in the long-run. As will
be shown in Section 3, quantity and quality together determine the threshold
belief in a good project the ¯rm needs to have in order for investment to be
optimal.
3 The Optimal Investment Decision
In determining the optimal output level, the ¯rm chooses the output that
maximizes its expected pro¯t °ow. Since the ¯rm is risk-neutral, it is only
interested in the expected values of investing in the project and waiting for
more information.
The uncertainty about the true state of the project and the irreversibility
of investment induce an option value of waiting for more signals. In this
section we will show how to ¯nd the critical level for p(n;g) at which the
¯rm is indi®erent between investing and waiting, while taking into account
2This assumption is not as strong as it seems, for if ¸ <
1
2 the ¯rm can perform the
same analysis replacing ¸ with 1 ¡ ¸. If ¸ =
1
2 the signals are not informative at all
and the ¯rm would do best by making a now-or-never decision, using its ex ante belief
p(0;0) = p0.
7the option value of waiting. After having determined the critical level we
know that it is optimal to invest as soon as p(n;g) exceeds this level.
First, we explicitly calculate p(n;g). To simplify matters considerably,
de¯ne k := 2g ¡ n, the number of good signals in excess of bad signals, and
³ :=
1¡p0
p0 , the unconditional odds of the project being bad. By using Bayes'
rule we now obtain:
p(n;g) =
I P(n;gjH)I P(H)
I P(n;gjH)I P(H) + I P(n;gjL)I P(L)
=
¸g(1 ¡ ¸)n¡gp0
¸g(1 ¡ ¸)n¡gp0 + (1 ¡ ¸)g¸n¡g(1 ¡ p0)
=
¸k
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k ´ p(k):
(1)
The critical level of k where the ¯rm is indi®erent between investing and
not investing in the project is denoted by k¤. Note that at any arrival of
an h-signal k increases and at any arrival of an l-signal k decreases. Hence,
enough h-signals must arrive to reach the critical level. The critical level of
the conditional belief in high revenues is denoted by p¤ = p(k¤).
Suppose that the state of the process at a particular point in time is
given by k. Then there are three possibilities. First, k might be such that
k ¸ k¤ and p(k) ¸ p¤. Then it is optimal for the ¯rm to directly invest in
the project. In this case the value of the project for the ¯rm, denoted by ­,
is given by
­(k) = UHp(k) ¡ I: (2)
A second possibility is that, even after a new h-signal arriving, it is still
not optimal to invest, i.e. k < k¤ ¡ 1. We assume that pricing with respect
to the objective probability measure implies risk-neutrality concerning the
information gathering process. Then the value of the opportunity to invest
for the ¯rm, denoted by V1, must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
rV1(k) = 1
dtI E(dV1(k)): (3)
Departing from this equation the following second order linear di®erence
8equation can be constructed:
rV1(k) = ¹
£
p(k)(¸V1(k + 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k ¡ 1))+
+ (1 ¡ p(k))(¸V1(k ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k + 1)) ¡ V1(k)
¤
, (r + ¹)V1(k) = ¹
£
(2p(k)¸ + 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ p(k))V1(k + 1)+




Eq. (4) states that the value of the option at state k must equal the dis-
counted expected value an in¯nitesimal amount of time later. Using eq. (1)
it holds that
2p(k)¸ + 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ p(k) =
¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k (5)
and
p(k) + ¸ ¡ 2p(k)¸ =
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1)
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k : (6)
Substituting eqs. (5) and (6) in (4), and de¯ning F(k) := (¸k + ³(1 ¡
¸)k)V1(k), yields
(r + ¹)F(k) = ¹F(k + 1) + ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)F(k ¡ 1): (7)
Eq. (7) is a second order linear homogeneous di®erence equation which has
as general solution
F(k) = A¯k;
where A is a constant and ¯ is a solution of the homogeneous equation
Q(¯) ´ ¯2 ¡
r + ¹
¹
¯ + ¸(1 ¡ ¸) = 0: (8)








¹ + 1)2 ¡ 4¸(1 ¡ ¸): (9)
Note that Q(0) = ¸(1 ¡ ¸) > 0 and Q(1 ¡ ¸) = ¡ r
¹(1 ¡ ¸) · 0. Since the
graph of Q is an upward pointing parabola we must have ¯1 ¸ 1 ¡ ¸ and
0 < ¯2 < 1 ¡ ¸ (see Figure 1). The value function V1(¢) is then given by
V1(k) =
F(k)




¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k: (10)
3It should be noted that for all ¸ it holds that 4¸(1 ¡ ¸) · 1. Since equality holds i®




1 ¡ ¸ +
¯2 ¯1
Figure 1: Graph of Q.
Here it is important to note that, when the number of l-signals relative to
h-signals tends to in¯nity, then the value of the ¯rm should converge to zero,
i.e. lim
k!¡1
V (k) = 0. This implies that we only need to consider the larger
root ¯1, so that A2 = 0.4
In the ¯nal case, the value of k is such that it is not optimal to invest in
the project right away. However, if the following signal is an h-signal, it will
be optimal to invest, i.e k¤ ¡ 1 · k < k¤. In this region the value function
V2(¢) for the ¯rm must satisfy eq. (3) with V1(¢) replaced by V2(¢), i.e.
rV2(k) = ¹
£
p(k)(¸­(k + 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k ¡ 1)) + (1 ¡ p(k))
(¸V1(k ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)­(k + 1)) ¡ V2(k)
¤
, (r + ¹)V2(k) = ¹
£
(2p(k)¸ + 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ p(k))­(k + 1)+









¸UHp(k) ¡ (¸p(k) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ p(k)))I







If an h-signal arrives, the process jumps to the region where k ¸ k¤ and if
an l-signal arrives the process jumps to the region where k < k¤. Therefore
the value V2 is completely determined by V1(k¡1) and ­(k+1). The value




k if k ! ¡1. Hence, if A2 6= 0, then V (k) ! §1 if k ! ¡1.
10function V is then given by
V (k) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
V1(k) if k < k¤ ¡ 1
V2(k) if k¤ ¡ 1 · k < k¤
UHp(k) ¡ I if k ¸ k¤;
(13)
where V1(k) and V2(k) are given by (10) and (12), respectively.
To determine A1 and k¤ we solve the continuity condition V1(k¤ ¡ 1) =





1 ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)
[UH¸k¤
(r + ¹(1 ¡ ¸))
¡ rI(¸k¤
+ ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¤
) ¡ ¹I(¸³(1 ¡ ¸)k¤
+ (1 ¡ ¸)¸k¤
)]:
Substituting A1 in the former equation leads to an expression for p¤ ´ p(k¤):
p¤ =
1




¯1(r + ¹)(r + ¹(1 ¡ ¸)) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(1 + ¯1 ¡ ¸))
¯1(r + ¹)(r + ¹¸) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(¯1 + ¸))
: (15)








From eq. (16) it is obtained that k¤ decreases with p0. Hence, less additional
information is needed when the initial belief in high revenues is already high.
Next, we check whether the optimal belief p¤ is a well-de¯ned probability.
The following proposition establishes this result, which is proved in the
appendix. It furthermore shows the link between this approach and the
traditional net present value rule (NPV). Note that the critical belief under
the latter approach is obtained by solving I E(Ujk) = 0. This yields pNPV =
I
UH.
5Note that, despite the fact that k is an integer variable, the continuity and the value
matching conditions should hold because the critical level k
¤ can be any real number.
Since the realisations of k are discrete, the ¯rm invests as soon as k = dk
¤e.
11Proposition 1 For UH ¸ I it holds that p¤ · 1. Furthermore, p¤ > pNPV .
So, the result that is obtained in the standard real option model, namely
that the criterion for investment to be undertaken is less tight under NPV
than under the optimal approach, carries over to this model. The reason
is the existence of a value of waiting for more information to arrive that
reduces uncertainty.
Using eq. (14), one can obtain comparative static results. These are
stated in the following proposition, the proof of which is given in the ap-
pendix.
Proposition 2 The threshold belief in a good project, p¤, increases with I,
r and ¸ and decreases with UH.
The fact that p¤ increases with r is caused by the so-called net present value
e®ect. If r increases, future income is valued less so that the net present value
decreases. Therefore, the ¯rm is willing to wait longer with investment until
it has more information about the actual state of the project. An increase
in ¸ leads to an increase in p¤, which can be explained by the fact that
¸ is a measure for the informativeness of the signal. Therefore, it is less
costly in terms of waiting time to require a higher level of p¤. This does not
necessarily imply that one should wait for more signals to arrive, a point
which we elaborate upon in Section 5. It is impossible to get a knife-edged
result on the comparative statics with respect to ¹, although simulations
suggest that in most cases p¤ increases with ¹, which con¯rms intuition.




An important question the ¯rm faces is how likely it is that it makes a
wrong decision, in the sense that it invests while the project is bad. This
question can be answered quantitatively by calculating the probability that
k¤ is reached while the project is bad. In order to do so, de¯ne
P(k¤)(k) := I P(9t¸0 : kt ¸ k¤jk0 = k;L) (17)
Of course, for k ¸ k¤ it holds that P(k¤)(k) = 1. A second order linear
di®erence equation can be obtained governing P (k¤)(k). Notice that from
12k the process reaches either k ¡ 1 or k + 1 with probabilities ¸ and 1 ¡ ¸,
respectively, given that the project is bad. Therefore, one obtains
P(k¤)(k) = (1 ¡ ¸)P(k¤)(k + 1) + ¸P(k¤)(k ¡ 1): (18)
Using the boundary conditions P (k¤)(k¤) = 1 and lim
k!¡1
P(k¤)(k) = 0, one







Hence, the probability of a wrong decision decreases when the quality of the
signals increases. The ex ante probability of a wrong decision is given by
P(k¤)(k0).
The error measure P (k¤)(¢) gives a worst-case scenario: the probability
that a ¯rm engages in an investment that has low pro¯tability. Another
error measure would be given by the probability that the ¯rm forgoes an
investment that would have generated a high pro¯t stream, i.e. the proba-
bility that k¤ is not reached within a certain time T given that the project
is good. Note however that since ¸ > 1
2 this probability equals zero for
T = 1. For any ¯nite time T it is possible to calculate the probability that
the ¯rm has not invested before T given that the project is good. In order
to calculate this probability, denote for all k the pdf of the distribution of
















where Ik(¢) denotes the modi¯ed Bessel function with parameter k. This
is the unconditional density of ¯rst passage times. Given the ¯rst passage
time distribution it holds for all 0 < T < 1 and k < k¤ that
~ P
(k¤)
k (T) := I P(:9t2[0;T] : kt ¸ k¤jH;k0 = k)





Since there is a positive probability mass on the project being bad, the
expectation of the time of investment does not exist. However, conditional
13on the project being good, one can calculate the expected time of investment
using the conditional density of ¯rst passage times, which is obtained in a










¸(1 ¡ ¸)t)e¡¹t: (21)
5 Economic Interpretation
As an example to see how UH and UL arise, consider a market where inverse





Y ¡ q if q · Y and H
0 otherwise;
where q is the quantity supplied. There is only one supplier so that the
¯rm is a monopolist. The costs of producing q units are given by the cost
function
C(q) = cq; c ¸ 0:
The pro¯t of producing q units is then given by
¼(q) = P(q)q ¡ C(q):
Suppose for a moment that the project is good, i.e. that demand is high.











Solving for q using the ¯rst order condition yields the optimal output level
q¤ = Y ¡c
2 , leading to the maximal pro¯t stream
UH = 1
r[P(q¤)q¤ ¡ C(q¤)]: (22)
If the project is bad it is optimal not to produce at all. Hence, the revenue
if demand is zero, UL, is given by,
UL = 0: (23)
14Y = 8 r = 0:1
c = 5 ¹ = 4
I = 12 ¸ = 0:8
p0 = 1
2
Table 2: Parameter values
In Proposition 2 an analytical result for comparative statics is given. To
get some feeling for the magnitude of several e®ects we consider a numerical
example. Consider a market structure as described above with parameter
values as given in Table 2. So, the discount rate r is set at 10%. The
probability of a correct signal is 0.8 and on average four signals arrive every
period.
Based on these parameter values the value function is calculated as func-
tion of k and depicted in Figure 2.6 From this ¯gure one can see that the















Figure 2: Value function. The dashed line denotes the NPV.
NPV rule prescribes not to invest at the moment the option becomes avail-
able (k = 0). In fact, in order to invest, the NPV rule demands that the
NPV must be positive so that the belief of the ¯rm in high market demand
should at least be approximately 0.53 (kNPV ¼ 0:10). However, our ap-
proach speci¯es that the ¯rm's belief should exceed p¤ ¼ 0:96. This may
seem an extremely high threshold, but it implies that the ¯rm invests as
soon as k = 3, since k¤ ¼ 2:23. The NPV rule prescribes that, in absence
6In interpreting Figure 2, notice that realizations of k are discrete, although k
¤ can be
any real number (see Footnote 5).
15of l-signals, only one h-signal is needed, while under our approach the ¯rm
invests after three h-signals (net from l-signals). From eq. (19) it is obtained
that the probability of investing in a bad project while using the optimal
approach equals P (k¤)(0) = 0:00156. Application of the NPV rule gives
P(kNPV )(0) = 0:25. Hence, the probability of making a wrong decision us-
ing the optimal approach is negligible, while it is reasonably large when the
NPV rule is used. The other error measure, ~ Pk¤
k (¢), is depicted in Figure 3
for di®erent values of T. One observes that the error of the second type


















Figure 3: Probability that investment has not taken place before time T
given that the project is good.
converges to zero fast. The probability of not having invested by period 6
given that the project is good is already negligible.
Using the same parameters we can see how the critical value k¤ changes
with ¸. From Proposition 2 we can conclude that the critical level for the
believe in a good project increases with the quality of the signal ¸, as one
can also see in the left-hand panel of Figure 4. If ¸ is higher, then the
informativeness of a signal is higher. So, it is more attractive for the ¯rm
to demand a higher certainty about the goodness of the market. This belief
however, is reached after fewer signals as can be seen from the right-hand
panel of Figure 4.
If one takes Y = 50, c = 10, I = 500, ¸ = 0:8, r = 0:1 and ¹ = 7,
one obtains pNPV = 0:125. Since p0 = 1=2 this implies kNPV < 0. Hence,
the ¯rm invests immediately at time 0 if it applies the NPV rule. So, if
the project is bad, the ¯rm invests in the bad project with probability 1.
Applying our decision rule gives p¤ = 0:842, implying that the ¯rm invests




























Figure 4: Comparative statics for ¸.
if k = 2. The probability of a wrong decision then becomes P 2(0) = 0:06.
Again, our approach greatly reduces this probability compared to the NPV
rule.
Consider an example where UH = 50, I = 30, r = 0:1 and p0 = 0:5.
First, we consider the situation where the project is good. Using the condi-
tional ¯rst passage time density in eq. (21) one can calculate the expected
time until investment takes place as a function of ¹ and ¸, cf. Figures 5 and
6. One can see that both functions are not continuous and the expected


















Figure 5: Comparative statics of expected time of investment given a good
project for ¹ with ¸ = 0:7 ¯xed.
time of investment is not monotonic with respect to ¹. This stems from the
fact that the realisations of k are discrete. Hence, for certain combinations
of ¹ and ¸, the threshold jumps from dk¤e to dk¤e+1. If p¤ increases in ¹ (as

















Figure 6: Comparative statics of expected time of investment given a good
project for ¸ with ¹ = 4 ¯xed.
it usually does), k¤ is also increasing in ¹. If, as a result, dk¤e increases with
unity, one additional good signal (in excess of bad signals) is needed before
it is optimal to undertake the project. This implies that the expected time
before investment jumps upwards. Immediately after a jump, the expected
time decreases continuously with ¹, as intuition suggests, until the threshold
jumps again.
Concerning the comparative statics with respect to ¸ we already observed
that an increase in p¤ can lead to a decrease in k¤. This implies that for
certain values of ¸ the threshold dk¤e decreases with unity. As soon as this
happens, there is a downward jump in the expected time of investment. So,
for ¸ the discreteness of k works in the same direction as the increase of the
quality of the signals.
We also analyse the comparative statics of the probability of investment
before time T = 20 with respect to the parameters ¹ and ¸ using the uncon-
ditional ¯rst passage time density in eq. (20), cf. Figure 7. One can see that
this probability is not monotonically increasing in ¹ and ¸. Particularly,
one can see from Figure 8 that, taking ¸ = 0:7, the comparative statics for
¹ are both non-continuous and non-monotonic. The explanation for this
behaviour is the same as for the comparative statics of the expected time
of investment given a good project. Note, however, that th increase in the
probability of investment after each jump increases less fast. This is due to






























































Figure 7: Comparative statics of the probability of investment before T = 20
for ¸ and ¹.
















































Figure 8: Comparative statics of the probability of investment before T = 20
with ¸ = 0:7 for ¹.
6 Conclusions
In this paper a situation was analysed where a ¯rm has the opportunity to
invest in a project. Initially, the pro¯tability of the project is unknown, but
as time passes the ¯rm receives signals about the pro¯tability of the invest-
ment. There are two types of signals: one type indicating the project to be
pro¯table and the other type indicating it to be unpro¯table. The present
paper di®ers from the standard literature on investment under uncertainty
(see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) in that uncertainty diminishes in the course
of time. The ¯rm has a { subjective { a priori belief about the pro¯tability
of the project. A posterior belief about the pro¯tability is obtained in a
19Bayesian way each time a signal arrives. It turns out that it is optimal for
the ¯rm to invest as soon as its belief in a pro¯table project exceeds a certain
critical level. An analytical expression for this critical level is provided and
it is seen that this level depends crucially on the reliability and the quantity
of the signals and the ¯rm's discount rate. Given the initial belief in a good
project the critical level can be translated in a number of signals indicating
a good project net from signals indicating a bad project. In other words,
from the critical belief it can be derived how many "good" signals in excess
of "bad" signals are needed before it is optimal for the ¯rm to invest.
An interesting extension of the present model is to look at what happens
when the ¯rm is not a monopolist, but if there are rivalling ¯rms to invest in
the same project. This requires using game theoretic concepts in the present
setting. In the standard real options framework such an analysis has been
carried out by e.g. Huisman (2001), Lambrecht and Perraudin (1999) and
Boyer et al. (2001).
Another topic for further research is to include costs for receiving the
signals. In this way one obtains a model for optimal sampling, closely related
to statistical decision theory. For the standard real options model this has
been done by Moscarini and Smith (2001). An interpretation of such a
model could be that a ¯rm can decide once about the intensity and quality
of R&D, leading to a combination of ¹ and ¸. If one assumes a cost function
for ¹ and ¸ one can solve a two stage decision problem where the ¯rst stage
consists of determining R&D intensity and quantity, while the second stage
consists of the timing of investment. In fact, this paper solves the second
stage. With simulations one could solve the ¯rst stage, using our analysis
as an input. Since the value stream depends on the (rather complicated)
¯rst passage density of the threshold, analytical results can probably not be
found. One could even try to extend the model to a situation where the
¯rm can continuously adjust its R&D intensity and quality, adding again to
the complexity of the problem.
Finally, one could extend the idea of diminishing uncertainty. For in-
stance, to look at a market where two ¯rms are competing, with imperfect
information about each each other's cost functions. Gradually, ¯rms receive
signals on each other's behaviour from which they infer the opponent's cost
function, which then in°uences their strategies.
20Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Denote the denominator of ª by d(ª). Analogously, we denote the numer-
ator of ª by n(ª). Using ¯1 ¸ 1 ¡ ¸, it is easy to derive that ª < 1. If
r = 0, it holds that ¯1 = ¸. Therefore,
n(0) = ¸¹2(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)¹ = 0:
Furthermore, using that ¯1 ¸ (1 ¡ ¸) and
@¯1
@r > 0, it can be obtained that
dn(ª)
dr > 0. So, ª > 0 and p¤ is a well-de¯ned probability. Furthermore,
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Simple calculus gives the result for UH and I. To prove the proposition
for r, ¹, and ¸, let us ¯rst derive the comparative statics of ¯1 for these










From Figure 1 one can see that @Q




Hence, it must hold that
@¯1
@r > 0. In a similar way one obtains
@¯1
@¹ < 0 and
@¯1
@¸ > 0.
The numerator and denominator of ª can be written in the following
form
n(ª) = ´(r;¹;¸) ¡ 2¹(1 ¡ ¸)³(r;¹;¸);
d(ª) = ´(r;¹;¸) ¡ 2¹(1 ¡ ¸)º(r;¹;¸);
21where
´(r;¹;¸) = ¯1(r + ¹)(r + ¹¸) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(¯1 + ¸));
³(r;¹;¸) = ¯1(r + ¹) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸);
º(r;¹;¸) = r(1 ¡ ¸) + ¹(1 ¡ ¸)2:
Since ª > 0, this implies that to determine the sign of the derivative of
ª with respect to one of the parameters, one only needs to compare the













@r < 0 and
@p¤
@r > 0.
For ¸ a similar exercise can be done, yielding
@³(¢)
@¸















@¸ > 0. ¤
References
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992). A Model of Growth through Creative
Destruction. Econometrica, 60, 323{351.
Boyer, M., P. Lasserre, T. Mariotti, and M. Moreaux (2001). Real Options,
Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments. mimeo, Univer-
sit¶ e du Qu¶ ebec µ a Montr¶ eal, Canada.
Dixit, A.K. and R.S. Pindyck (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Feller, W. (1971). An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applica-
tions, volume II (Second ed.). John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.
Huisman, K.J.M. (2001). Technology Investment: A Game Theoretic Real
Options Approach. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Nether-
lands.
22Jensen, R. (1982). Adoption and Di®usion of an Innovation of Uncertain
Pro¯tability. Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 182{193.
Lambrecht, B. and W. Perraudin (1999). Real Options and Preemption un-
der Incomplete Information. Working Paper, Birbeck College, UK.
Malueg, D.A. and S.O. Tsutsui (1997). Dynamic R&D Competition with
Learning. RAND Journal of Economics, 28, 751{772.
McDonald, R. and D. Siegel (1986). The Value of Waiting to Invest. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 101, 707{728.
Moscarini, G. and L. Smith (2001). The Optimal Level of Experimentation.
Econometrica, 69, 1629{1644.
Oksendal, B. (2000). Stochastic Di®erential Equations (Fifth ed.). Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, Germany.
Reinganum, J.F. (1981). Dynamic Games of Innovation. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 25, 21{41.
23